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GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITIES 
ENFORCEMENT: A SHIFT TOWARD 
ENHANCED REGULATORY INTENSITY 
IN BRAZIL’S CAPITAL MARKET? 
Eugenio J. Cárdenas* 
INTRODUCTION 
As we are constantly being reminded, capital markets are now so glob-
alized and highly interconnected that a weakness within one market or 
within its regulatory oversight can serve to undermine other markets, 
like a weak link in a chain . . . Our partnerships with regulators 
throughout the world are critically important to rooting out fraud and 
misconduct in our markets . . . . Over the years . . . we all have come to 
reach a better understanding of how critical it is—especially in a fast 
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moving global marketplace—to . . . learn . . . best practices from 
around the world that we can incorporate, as appropriate, into our re-
spective enforcement programs. This sharing of best practices results in 
a race to regulatory quality as opposed to the proverbial race to the bot-
tom. It is my hope, and belief, that such a race to the top will create real 
benefits for investors in the markets under our jurisdictions.1 
he above words, recently conveyed by U.S. SEC Commissioner 
Elisse B. Walter to her counterpart regulators from over sixty ju-
risdictions of the world, echo the increasing phenomenon of global legal 
convergence and international cooperation among securities commis-
sions, in the realm of capital market surveillance and enforcement. This 
Paper, written for the “Globalization of the United States Litigation 
Model” symposium at Brooklyn Law School, October 21, 2011, ventures 
into the mentioned phenomenon, to explore the following puzzle of 
globalization, corporate law enforcement, and financial development—
are emerging capital markets shifting toward enhanced regulatory inten-
sity in the enforcement of their securities laws, under the context of 
global legal convergence? 
In that spirit, focus is placed on the emerging Latin American region, 
namely Brazil’s securities market. Aim is set at identifying and reflecting 
upon selected instances that, when combined and analyzed, suggest that 
Brazil has pursued the enforcement of its securities laws with enhanced 
regulatory intensity during the past decade—both in terms of adopting 
enforcement practices characteristic to developed global markets, and of 
implementing these practices—in light of preliminary evidence of en-
forcement on the ground. 
By the turn of the century, Latin America had undergone an unprece-
dented democratization wave2 accompanied by a period of “intense and 
growing commercial and financial exchange among countries” usually 
referred to as globalization.3 As with other contemporary democracies, 
countries of the region became tied to the “rule of law,” which typically 
                                                                                                         
 1. Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n [S.E.C.], Remarks at the 
Closing of the U.S. SEC International Institute for Securities Enforcement and Market 
Oversight (Nov. 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch111811ebw.htm. 
 2. See LARRY DIAMOND, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD FREE 
SOCIETIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 41 (2008). Diamond refers to a third wave of de-
mocracy, before the turn of the century, which includes Latin America. 
 3. Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, Latin Legal Cultures in the 
Age of Globalization, in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 1, 4–5 (Law-
rence M. Friedman & Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo eds., 2003). 
T 
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involves stable rules, honest judges, enforcement of contracts, and a reli-
able civil service.4 Further, convergence among legal systems quickly 
spread across Latin American securities markets. In this legal conver-
gence process, the enforcement of corporate law gained particular rele-
vance for its potential to ensure higher disclosure and governance stan-
dards aimed at investor protection and capital market development.5 
Driven by this global convergence phenomenon, a discourse on “fi-
nancial regulatory intensity”6 was triggered within the United States 
(“U.S.”) law and finance literature. Building on theories advancing that 
the enforcement of corporate law fosters investor protection,7 and, in 
turn, capital market development,8 and economic growth,9 this discourse 
seeks to determine the intensity with which jurisdictions should enforce 
their financial regulations. Conceptually, optimal regulatory intensity 
may be thought of as enforcement that is enough to deter, and/or com-
pensate,10 or when considered from a cost-benefit analysis, as an assess-
ment of whether the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs of addi-
tional enforcement. Despite these conceptual views, there is no clear em-
pirical measure of optimality or levels of enforcement. Nevertheless, sig-
nificant efforts have started to present preliminary evidence of enforce-
                                                                                                         
 4. Id. at 16. 
 5. Securities enforcement has, for example, been a recurring theme in The Latin 
American Corporate Governance Roundtable meetings for over a decade. Among other 
efforts, the roundtable has applied a series of surveys aiming at better understanding the 
regulatory and institutional frameworks of the main securities enforcement systems of the 
region. Regulators, policy-makers, and market participants gather on an ongoing basis to 
discuss these surveys’ results, and other developments. 
 6. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 229, 229–78 (2007) [hereinafter Coffee, The Impact of Enforcement]; Howell 
E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and 
Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 275 (2007). 
 7. See Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 27–28 
(2006) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Securities Laws]. 
 8. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1114 (1998) 
[hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance]; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants 
of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1131–32 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal 
Determinants]; Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 
52 J. FIN. 737, 738 (1997). 
 9. See Robert King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be 
Right, 108 Q.J. ECON. 717, 717–18 (1993); Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, 
Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 537, 537–58 (1998). 
 10. See Andrew Kuritzkes, Section V: Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, in COMM. 
CAPITAL MKT. REG., INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS 
REGULATION 115 (Jenepher Moseley ed., 2006) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT], available 
at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf. 
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ment in action that speaks to the intensity with which markets enforce 
their corporate law, providing a better understanding of securities en-
forcement systems and their benefits across jurisdictions.11 
This Paper addresses Brazil, the leading Latin American financial sys-
tem. It looks into its securities enforcement system during the wave of 
legal and institutional reform dating back to the turn of the century,12 
resulting from competing dynamics between incumbent controlling own-
ers resisting change, and global forces demanding enhanced corporate 
law and governance.13 A decade onward, the study attempts to identify 
whether Brazil’s capital market shows signs of enhanced regulatory in-
tensity in the enforcement of its securities laws. 
To approach this question, this Paper queries into the extent to which 
Brazil has (1) adopted a more robust institutional design of enforcement, 
and (2) boosted its implementation. To that end, the research identifies 
and reflects upon selected accounts that suggest enhanced enforcement 
structures and powers, and increases in actual enforcement activity and 
resources allocation toward enforcement during the past ten years. 
Among other findings, this study identifies a transformation of Brazil’s 
securities enforcement system, both in the establishment and implemen-
tation of new institutions and enforcement practices and the revival of 
old ones. This evolution followed a shift in policy in 2005, whereby Bra-
zil’s Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de 
Valores Mobiliários—“CVM”) decided that securities enforcement was 
its main priority.14 
                                                                                                         
 11. See John Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical 
Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
687, 689 (2009); Jackson, supra note 6, at 278–86; Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, 
Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence 11 (Harv. 
Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08–28, 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1000086. 
 12. See María Helena dos Santos Fernandes de Santana, Chair, Comissão de Valores 
Mobiliários [Brazilian Securities & Exchange Commission] [CVM], Presentation at Foro 
Sobre Modelos de Supervisión: Evolución de la Regulación de los Mercados de Valores 
en Brazil (Sept. 16, 2008) (Braz.). 
 13. See Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Dual-
ism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the U.S. and the EU 45–46 
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. [ECGI] Working Paper Series in Law, Paper No. 149, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1541226. Gilson 
et al. discuss how resistance to corporate governance legal reform, by incumbent players 
of Brazil’s financial system, led to the establishment of the Novo Mercado market that, 
via self-regulation, imposed standards that went beyond the law. 
 14. CVM’s prioritization on enforcement began with the administration of former 
Chair Marcelo Trindade, and deepened under the responsibility of current Chair María 
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CVM appears to be evolving into an ex-post enforcement-driven 
agency. Somewhat like enforcement systems in developed markets, such 
as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) model, Bra-
zil’s regulator now embeds features like a Board of Commissioners with 
political independence, a stand-alone enforcement program with a man-
date, an enhanced tool-kit to combat serious wrongdoing, the possibility 
to negotiate settlements, and partnerships with the criminal justice 
authorities, the industry, and the international community. 
Developments suggesting enhanced regulatory intensity include 
CVM’s new enforcement program. Through specialized divisions—the 
Superintendencia de Processos Sancionadores and the Procuradoria 
Federal Especializada—this program introduced a new institutional de-
sign, combining CVM staff with federal attorneys and investigators. The 
latter half of the decade accordingly saw an increase in enforcement ac-
tivity in terms of administrative actions and sanctions pursued and im-
posed by this new enforcement program. Also notable was the significant 
reduction in the time required to decide even the most complex adminis-
trative procedures. Moreover, serious wrongdoing, namely insider trad-
ing and market manipulation—which had been criminalized earlier in the 
decade—began to be more visibly targeted and sanctioned, not only ad-
ministratively, but also through an older institution that had seldom been 
employed—the Collective Civil Action. A strong partnership with the 
criminal justice authorities also grew, capitalizing on the mentioned of-
fenses. Tools for “real-time” enforcement, including the freezing of as-
sets, subpoena powers, and injunctive orders, began to be deployed as 
well. 
Additionally, the Committee for Settlements of Proceedings was estab-
lished by CVM in order to identify and propose potential settlements and 
institutionalize the settlement negotiation process. Consequently, the lat-
ter half of the decade saw a striking rise in Termos de Compromisso set-
tlements, an instrument that had been available to the regulator for years 
but that lacked legitimacy and use. 
Revealing signs of a “multiple-enforcers” model, an enhanced Self-
Regulatory Organization (“SRO”) regime developed in both mandatory 
and voluntary fronts. On the statutory—thus, mandatory—dimension, 
CVM provided for a detailed legal framework of self-regulation for or-
                                                                                                         
Helena dos Santos Fernandes de Santana. See CVM RELATÓRIO DE GESTÃO 2005 
[ANNUAL REPORT 2005] 15–16 (2005) (Braz.), available at 
http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/relgest/RelGest2005.pdf. 
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ganized markets15 that not only resulted in enhanced listing requirements, 
but also in practically outsourcing market surveillance to an autonomous 
non-profit organization with enhanced rule-making and enforcement 
powers, BM&FBOVESPA Supervisão de Mercados (“BSM”). On the 
voluntary front, the regulator provided incentives that resulted in firms 
listing in the market segments of the stock exchange that require higher 
corporate governance standards, including the Novo Mercado market. 
Cooperation with other securities regulators, adherence to international 
principles, and sponsoring technical assistance workshops for improving 
enforcement, led by developed markets, became clear trends, too. The 
increase in enforcement activity was supported by a surge in budget and 
staffing resources during this period. 
Perhaps the biggest hurdle faced by Brazil’s securities enforcement 
system is in the private enforcement arena. The lack of specialized tribu-
nals and judges trained in capital market matters has resulted in costly 
and stagnant procedures and in the practical nonexistence of private 
rights of action. There are, nonetheless, signs of judicial specialization, 
with an experiment involving a commercial court. In addition, communi-
cation and information and knowledge exchange regarding capital mar-
kets has increased between the regulator and the judiciary. CVM and the 
judiciary have made agreements to that effect, whereby the judiciary in-
creasingly resorts to CVM for technical support on securities regulation. 
These research findings showcase how a new corporate governance 
culture is permeating the Brazilian securities market, reshaping legal 
structures and institutional designs of enforcement in the global arena. 
The findings provide a story about how emerging global markets may 
shift toward enhanced enforcement as they become aware of its potential 
benefits for their development. Finally, they shed light on how legal sys-
tems undergo transformation, in view of the interplay between social 
change, legal cultures, and institutions. 
Among other sources, the research draws from assorted data on en-
forcement activity and resources made available by CVM, published by 
its Ministry of Finance, and reported by the Latin American Corporate 
Governance Roundtable for Corporate Governance throughout the dec-
ade. Interviews with CVM’s Chairperson, and its Attorney General, offer 
a reaction to the data, further illustrating the development and challenges 
of securities enforcement in Brazil. 
The Paper unfolds as follows: Section I comments on the financial 
regulatory discourse and the potential benefits of securities enforcement, 
                                                                                                         
 15. Including over-the-counter (“OTC”) and commodities and futures markets. 
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with a focus on Latin America. Section II identifies and comments on 
particular accounts of legal and institutional reform in Brazil’s securities 
enforcement system during the past decade. It further discusses how this 
framework has been implemented, in light of preliminary evidence of 
enforcement activity. The Article then presents concluding remarks on 
how these newly adopted institutions and their implementation reflect 
enhanced regulatory intensity. 
I. A WORD ON FINANCIAL REGULATORY INTENSITY AND THE 
PERCEIVED BENEFITS OF SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT IN 
LATIN AMERICA 
Was there reason to believe that the emerging markets of Latin Amer-
ica would develop enhanced regulatory intensity in the enforcement of 
their securities laws by the end of the past decade? At the turn of the cen-
tury, the answer might have likely been negative. Globalization, the rule 
of law, and legal convergence started to surface at the time in the re-
gion’s securities markets. Countries joined the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) and, consequently, 
issued corporate governance codes. Best corporate practices even found 
their way into the formal legal systems of the region.16 Yet, it would have 
been hard to believe that the incumbent players of the securities markets 
would give up their private benefits of control17 and, in turn, give in to 
corporate governance, minority rights, and investor protection. It would 
have been difficult to imagine that strong regulatory frameworks govern-
ing the public firm would arrive and then be implemented and enforced 
effectively. After all, it remained highly questionable as to whether the 
basic preconditions of a strong capital market—property and contractual 
rights and their enforceability—were even in place. 
Despite the region’s historical reputation for being a difficult corporate 
environment,18 investor protection ultimately gained considerable rele-
                                                                                                         
 16. For example, as early as 2001, the Mexican Securities Market Law was reformed, 
introducing substantive corporate governance provisions that were originally in the vol-
untary Best Corporate Practices Code. This tendency followed with reforms to the same 
law in 2003 and with the creation of a new Securities Market Law in 2005. 
 17. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio López de Silanes & Guillermo Zamarripa, Related 
Lending 13–15 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin. [ICF], Working Paper No. 02–19, 2002), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302128 (discussing evidence 
of tunneling in Mexico’s banking sector). 
 18. This refers to civil law jurisdictions with weak judiciaries, government corrup-
tion, and markets with concentrated ownership structures, in which the primary corporate 
governance concern is limiting self-dealing rather than reducing agency costs. 
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vance in the past decade. There was, no doubt, resistance by incumbent 
market participants opposing governance and disclosure. But there were 
also competing forces that countered this resistance and at times pre-
vailed, even if it meant creatively avoiding the formal legal system and 
implementing corporate governance through self-regulatory regimes, as 
in the case of Brazil’s Novo Mercado market segment. 
Emerging markets’ inclination to pursue a more stringent enforcement 
of their securities laws in the global marketplace might seem obvious 
today. Few would question that securities enforcement brings about in-
vestor protection and, consequently, capital market development and 
economic growth. Yet, these theories on the benefits of securities en-
forcement have only been empirically tested to a limited extent and the 
associations claimed are not all certain. 
It is debatable which variables should be used as proxies for enforce-
ment to explain development. Measuring enforcement in terms of regula-
tors’ powers may be a rather “law in books” approach that does not ac-
count for actual implementation. Regulators’ resources might not trans-
late into real market supervision efforts. Enforcement activity can be 
misleading as a variable, too. Enforcement action is, after all, a function 
of the underlying compliance. A jurisdiction with a low volume of secu-
rities enforcement activity may be one with a high level of compliance 
by market participants. Such jurisdiction might also be one in which 
regulation alone deters wrongdoing. More actions and sanctions do not 
necessarily reflect effective enforcement and/or higher regulatory inten-
sity. 
Moreover, these measures are not readily comparable across jurisdic-
tions, given differences in the wrongdoing targeted, enforcement designs, 
and tool-kits, among many others. The benefits of enforcement, or lack 
thereof, vary across time and jurisdictions and are simply difficult to 
measure.19 
Nevertheless, there appears to be widespread consensus among juris-
dictions that corporate law and its enforcement matter. Perceptions on 
the importance of enforcement for their development may alone explain 
why Latin American markets undergoing convergence would shift to-
ward enhanced enforcement in the global context, as well be influenced 
by enforcement-driven frameworks with multiple-enforcement channels 
and singular regulatory intensity, like the U.S. model. Enforcement may 
be perceived by these markets as a key piece of the financial and eco-
nomic development puzzle that explains the leading position of devel-
                                                                                                         
 19. See Jackson, supra note 6, at 256. 
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oped financial systems—a piece that yields benefits such as reducing 
informational asymmetry and a firm’s cost of equity capital.20 Such per-
ceptions may speak to why investors are willing to pay a premium for the 
shares of an issuer that subjects itself to a particularly stringent regime. 
In the global arena, it may be considered a trigger to the “investor protec-
tion signaling” believed to attract cross-listings, decoding the functional 
convergence phenomenon behind the bonding hypothesis.21 
On the assumption that enforcement makes a difference, and in spite of 
the challenges in measuring it, academic literature, economic develop-
ment programs, and policy makers have continued to explore the inten-
sity of jurisdictions’ securities laws enforcement. Recent efforts have 
provided preliminary empirical evidence that begins to decipher regula-
tory intensity on the surface, and to associate it with the size and devel-
opment of markets. 
Comparisons across several jurisdictions have been made, in terms of 
both inputs, by way of resources allocated to public enforcement (for 
example, staffing and budget), as well as outputs, in the form of actual 
enforcement activity exerted.22 Preliminary findings for these jurisdic-
tions have reported that common law countries with more developed 
markets incur higher enforcement costs and enforcement activity volume 
than their civil law counterparts.23 Regulators’ resources allocated for 
market supervision have also been employed as enforcement proxies24 
and have associated public enforcement with robust markets.25 
To provide an example, the literature has defined the “U.S. Model” as 
one that (1) pursues the enforcement of securities laws with singular in-
                                                                                                         
 20. See Coffee, The Impact of Enforcement, supra note 6, at 244–46 (suggesting that 
the U.S.’s greater emphasis on enforcement reduces informational asymmetry and pro-
vides for a lower cost of equity capital). 
 21. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Conver-
gence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 691–95 
(1999). According to the bonding hypothesis set forth by Coffee, foreign firms opt into 
higher regulatory or disclosure standards, thereby committing (bonding) to more stringent 
governance standards than those of their domestic markets. Consequently, these firms 
have access to benefits such as raising equity capital and increasing shareholder value. 
Coffee further posits that, in seeking the mentioned benefits, firms may achieve func-
tional convergence by simply listing on a foreign stock exchange and “renting” its higher 
governance standards, without having to rely on their respective local laws being re-
formed. 
 22. See Jackson & Roe, supra note 11, at 8. 
 23. See Jackson, supra note 6, at 256, 272. 
 24. See La Porta et al., Securities Laws, supra note 7, at 27–28. 
 25. See Jackson & Roe, supra note 11, at 32. 
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tensity,26 and does so via (2) a dynamic blend of enforcement channels 
and enforcers. This “multiple-enforcers”27 approach involves public en-
forcement by an “enforcement-driven” securities regulator in partnership 
with other equally active law enforcement agencies, coupled with an en-
trepreneurial private enforcement system of class and derivative litiga-
tion and a quasi-governmental self-regulatory regime in which markets 
are practically regulators.28 Ongoing academic debate highlights the dy-
namics of this model by discussing whether private or public enforce-
ment is more highly associated with robust markets (“private” vs. “public 
primacy” views),29 and by exploring how the different enforcement 
modes fill each other’s gaps or serve as supplements to one another (the 
“multiple mechanisms” view).30 Regardless of whether the private, pub-
lic, or multiple-mechanisms primacy views empirically come out ahead, 
one may expect to find an active interplay of each enforcement mode 
exerting remarkable regulatory intensity. 
                                                                                                         
 26. See Coffee, The Impact of Enforcement, supra note 6, at 245; Jackson, supra note 
6, at 281; Robert Litan, Section III: Enforcement, in INTERIM REPORT, supra note 10, at 
71–92. 
 27. See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securi-
ties Laws, 100 CAL. L. REV. 115 (2012) providing a comprehensive analysis of the cen-
tralization debate revolving around the “multiple-enforcers” model characteristic of the 
United States’ securities enforcement system. 
 28. Rob Baggott, Regulatory Reform in Britain: The Changing Face of Self-
Regulation, 67 PUB. ADMIN. 435, 437 (1989). Considering self-regulation as a matter of 
degree, Baggott classifies it, among other criterion, with regards to its legal status. In 
essence, a self-regulatory regime would be governed by mere voluntary agreements. 
However, statutory law often backs these agreements, and it is not uncommon for gov-
ernments to reserve powers for overseeing and enforcing self-regulation. 
 29. Ongoing academic debates highlight the dynamics of this model by, for instance, 
discussing whether private and/or public enforcement prevail in better explaining capital 
market development. See Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-
Dealing, 88 J. POL. ECON. 430, 443–52 (2008); La Porta et al., Securities Laws, supra 
note 7, at 2–3; WORLD BANK, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS 5–7 
(2006), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPACCFINSER/Resources/Institutional.pdf. For 
competing views, see Jackson & Roe, supra note 11, at 15–16 and Armour et al., supra 
note 11, at 722. 
 30. See Michael Klausner, Are Securities Class Actions “Supplemental” to SEC En-
forcement? An Empirical Analysis 6 (Feb. 23, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ile/PNYUPapers/2010/Klausner_Are%20
Securities%20Class%20Actions.pdf. 
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It might just be that “[t]he United States has the toughest administra-
tive enforcement of securities laws in the world.”31 Annualized data from 
2002–2004 suggests both the singular intensity and the “multiple-
enforcers” at play—the SEC, the Department of Justice, the state regula-
tors, and at the time, NASD and NYSE—yielding an impressive yearly 
average of 3,624 public actions resulting in $5,287,483,485 in penalties. 
Of these, 639 actions were imposed by the SEC, amounting to 
$2,164,666,667 in monetary sanctions (respectively, 17.6% and 40.9% of 
the total).32 
Of course, the U.S. enforcement model could be considered an outlier. 
The high degree of regulatory intensity that it has presented in recent 
years may even border on “over-enforcement” (enforcement in excess of 
what is needed to deter and compensate), affecting capital market com-
petitiveness and, consequently, development. The burden of excessive 
enforcement, namely extreme consequences for wrongdoing, may lead 
domestic firms to avoid raising capital through U.S. securities markets, 
let alone foreign issuers who simply stay away.33 A healthy balance 
should be sought after by securities markets, and this concern has not 
gone unnoticed by Latin American jurisdictions.34 However, if compa-
nies commonly cite U.S. enforcement as the most important reason why 
they avoid the U.S. market, it is arguably also one of the market’s main 
strengths.35 Moreover, the emerging markets of Latin America have 
likely not reached the point of over-enforcement yet. Any increase in 
regulatory intensity and enforcement at their earlier stages of capital 
market development would be perceived as a positive sign and a shift in 
the direction of competitiveness and investor protection.36 
Yet, it is debatable whether emerging jurisdictions undergoing conver-
gence should adopt the features that set the securities enforcement sys-
tems of developed markets apart. Emerging jurisdictions tend to have 
smaller markets with concentrated ownership structures, rather than 
                                                                                                         
 31. Litan, supra note 26, at 71. 
 32. See Jackson, supra note 6, at 256, 272. All currency references depicted with a 
“$” shall refer to U.S. dollars. 
 33. Presumably rushed and political responses to crises during the past decade, as 
some have considered of both the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts, could play into 
this phenomenon. 
 34. See Eugenio J. Cárdenas, Mexican Corporations Entering and Leaving U.S. Mar-
kets: An Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002?, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 281, 296–97 
(2008). 
 35. See Litan, supra note 26, at 72–81. 
 36. Conversation with Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, U.S. S.E.C. (U.S. S.E.C., Washing-
ton, D.C., Oct. 2011). 
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deeper ones with dispersed shareholders. They normally suffer from 
weak judiciaries, government corruption, and low investor protection. 
Additionally, their primary corporate governance concern is usually lim-
iting self-dealing, rather than focusing on reducing agency costs. They 
also belong to a different legal tradition,37 and ongoing social change has 
led them to develop distinct legal cultures—attitudes and values with 
regard to law.38 Hence, their needs, in terms of legal structures and insti-
tutional designs, are bound to vary accordingly. Nonetheless, many of 
the elements included in the enforcement “tool-kits” of developed mar-
kets could be beneficial to emerging markets and serve as an effective 
roadmap for them.39 It is no wonder that Latin American regulators regu-
larly request technical assistance on enforcement provided by regulators 
in developed markets, including the SEC and the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). 
In sum, one might expect that Latin American securities markets per-
ceive securities enforcement as beneficial to their development and, 
hence, are focused on shifting toward enhanced regulatory intensity via 
the adoption of institutional designs employed by the more developed 
markets to the extent that it suits them. Selected instances regarding Bra-
zil may reveal this shift in the section that follows. 
II. A SHIFT IN THE DYNAMICS OF SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT 
IN BRAZIL 
A. A New Wave in the Regulatory Evolution of Brazil’s Securities Market 
A third regulatory era in the evolution of Brazil’s securities markets 
surfaced by the turn of the century, and continued through the past dec-
ade.40 Characterized by a wave of legal and institutional corporate re-
                                                                                                         
 37. Namely Civil Law, Common Law, and hybrid systems. 
 38. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE 
PERSPECTIVE 193–223 (1975). 
 39. See Z. Scott Birdwell, The Key Elements for Developing a Securities Market to 
Drive Economic Growth: A Roadmap for Emerging Markets, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
535, 543–44 (2011). 
 40. Maria Helena de Santana, CVM’s Chair, identifies three stages in the regulatory 
evolution of Brazil’s securities market. During the first stage (1964–1976) the financial 
system was structured. A Securities Market Law (Law 4.728 of 1965)—was enacted, and 
market discipline began to emerge. Lei No. 4.728, de 14 de Julho de 1965, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 16.7.1965 (Braz.). However, the absence of a securities 
regulator proved to be a shortcoming. Market supervision was in the hands of the Central 
Bank, to which investors were not of priority. Speculation due to lack of information and 
disclosure, market intermediaries and issuers without accountability, and poor oversight 
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form, this period was also defined by important signs of capital market 
development. Among other indicators, trading volume and market capi-
talization grew substantially,41 as did initial public offerings.42 The num-
ber of investment funds practically doubled.43 The shift toward dispersed 
ownership became more evident too.44 
To name just a few regulatory highlights, corporate governance reform 
found its way into the securities market early in the emergence period, if 
not as a matter of legislation at first, due to resistance by the incumbent 
                                                                                                         
and enforcement, among other factors, contributed to the stock market crisis of 1971 and 
1972. A second stage (1976–2001) began with reaction to the crisis, aimed at legal re-
form to promote accountability and duties of market intermediaries and issuers. Based on 
the U.S. SEC model, a new securities market law (Law 6.385 of December 7, 1976) was 
enacted and, with it, the Brazilian CVM came to life as an autonomous regulator with 
regulatory, supervisory, and sanctioning powers. See Lei No. 6.385, de 7 de Dezembro de 
1976, D.O.U. de 09.12.1976 (Braz.). CVM’s enforcement powers were, however, shared 
with the National Monetary Council and penalties were relatively insignificant. Brazil’s 
Corporations Law (Law No. 6.404) was also enacted, defining a legal framework for the 
public firm, aimed at enhancing investor confidence and protection. See Lei No. 6.404, de 
15 de Dezembro de 1976, D.O.U. de 17.12.1976 (Braz.). Among other features, the law 
provided for officer and director accountability, and for specific minority rights, enhanc-
ing disclosure, and imposing compulsory dividends. Still, the reform was not considered 
to have much impact in market development. Inefficient management could not be re-
placed through takeover activity, and firm expropriation (“tunneling”) was not properly 
dealt with. Brazil lacked the desired capital market culture and faced economic problems, 
such as the inflationary environment that deterred long-term investment during the 1980s. 
It was not until 1997 that the Securities Market Law (Law 6.385) underwent reform, 
boosting enforcement of the regulator, by increasing penalties and allowing settlement 
agreements. See Lei No. 6.385, de 14 de Julho de 1965, D.O.U. de 16.7.1965, redação 
dada pela Lei No. 9.457, de 5 de Maio de 1997, D.O.U. de 6.5.97 (Braz.). However, real 
implementation of these enforcement mechanisms did not materialize until the turn of the 
century, during the third stage (2001–present) described above. For more details, see 
Santana, supra note 12. 
 41. Alexandre Pinheiro dos Santos, Mitigating the Impact of Financial Crises on the 
Brazilian Capital Market, in 3 WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL LEGAL GOVERNANCE  337 (Hassane Cissé et al. eds., 2012). 
Market capitalization increased from $225 billion in 2000 to $1.5 trillion in 2010. The 
daily average trading of shares increased from $348 million to over $3 billion. 
 42. Public offerings of equities totaled $133 billion in 2010, doubling the amount of 
2009. Regarding IPOs, the total amount reached $2.1 billion in the first quarter of 2011. 
Id. 
 43. During the past decade—to over 10,000. Id. 
 44. Id. at 335, 337. 
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regime, through self-regulation.45 Sweeping legal reform included 
changes to the Corporations Law No. 6.404,46 providing for a series of 
clearly specified minority shareholder rights.47 An impressive array of 
rules on financial disclosure was issued on an ongoing basis, particularly 
in the latter part of the decade.48 Additionally, active coordination among 
financial governing bodies, focused on improving policy and regula-
tion,49 became a clear trend, as did convergence with international stan-
dards.50 
Nonetheless, developments in the realm of enforcement of Brazil’s se-
curities market deserve the most attention. Early in this recent regulatory 
phase, important foundations in the area of market surveillance were laid 
down for Brazil’s regulatory and institutional framework. Among others, 
                                                                                                         
 45. See id. at 338. Via the Novo Mercado, established in 2000 as a listing segment of 
the, then, Sao Paulo Stock Exchange, today BM&BOVESPA S.A.-Securities, Commodi-
ties and Futures Exchange. 
 46. See Lei 10.303, de 31 de Outubro de 2001, D.O.U. de 01.11.2001 (Braz.) (altering 
and adding provisions to Law No. 6.404, governing corporations, and Law No. 6.385, 
governing the securities market). 
 47. Among other provisions introduced were tag-along rights; the right of preferential 
(non-voting) shareholders to appoint a board member, initial public offerings (“IPOs”) 
for the case of increase in control; and the reduction of the limit of non-voting shares 
issued. See id. 
 48. See Pinheiro dos Santos, supra note 41, at 339–40. Examples of substantive rules 
issued by CVM, following the 2008 global financial crisis, may be cited. These include 
improving information disclosed by issuers on financial and derivative instruments (In-
strução CVM No. 475, de 17 de Dezembro de 2008, D.O.U. de 22.12.2008 (Braz.)); dis-
closure regarding corporate governance practices, risk management controls, issuers’ 
compensation and stock option plans (Instrução CVM No. 480, de 7 de Dezembro de 
2009, D.O.U. de 11.12.2011 (Braz.)); and the regulation of public requests by manage-
ment for the exercise of voting rights via proxy, including the disclosure of information 
to be made electronically available prior to a shareholders’ meeting (Instrução CVM No. 
481, de 17 de Dezembro de 2009, D.O.U. de 02.02.2010 (Braz.)). 
 49. Examples include the Capital Markets Working Group—established as an ongo-
ing joint effort of the different sectors of the financial system to produce policy on capital 
market development. Led by the Minister of Economic Policy, it is conformed by CVM, 
the Central Bank, SUSEP, SPC, the Ministry of Finance and the IRS. The Committee for 
Regulation and Supervision of Financial markets, Capital, Insurance, and Private Pension 
Plans (“COREMEC”), created in 2006 and aimed at reaching bilateral agreements on 
financial regulation and enforcement. Conformed by the President and the Director of 
each of the following bodies: Central Bank, CVM, SPC and SUSEP. 
 50. Examples include CVM signing the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Under-
standing for Cooperation and Assistance in 2009. See Int’l Org. of Sec. Commissions 
[IOSCO], Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and 
Cooperation and the Exchange of Information [MMoU] (May 2002), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf. 
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the Securities Act underwent significant reform in 2001, strengthening 
the organization and structure of Brazil’s CVM.51 The agency was given 
exclusive oversight over securities markets, which it previously shared 
with the National Monetary Council, granted administrative and budget-
ary independence aimed at political independence, and provided with a 
wider scope of supervision, including oversight of investment funds, col-
lective investment vehicles, and the derivatives, commodities, and fu-
tures markets. Serious corporate wrongdoings, including insider trading 
and market manipulation, were criminalized,52 and tools, like the ability 
to settle cases, were made available to the securities regulator as well. 
Nevertheless, implementation of this enforcement framework did not 
become prominent until the latter half of the decade. There may be mul-
tiple explanations for the sudden surge in enforcement activity, particu-
larly given that Brazil’s securities market was increasingly growing in 
the global context, in the midst of the global financial crisis of 2008.53 
The number of market participants and wrongdoing likely grew as well, a 
scenario in which regulatory reaction and enforcement would have made 
sense. However, a catalyst for the enhancement of regulatory intensity 
actually began in 2005: a shift in policy by Brazil’s CVM, making en-
forcement its primary area of priority. CVM evolved into an ex-post en-
forcement-driven agency, somewhat resembling enforcement systems of 
developed markets, both in light of the adoption and implementation of 
new institutions and enforcement practices, and the revival of old ones. 
Accordingly, there was a rise in enforcement activity. 
The following section identifies and discusses selected accounts that 
may suggest this enhanced regulatory intensity in the enforcement of 
Brazil’s securities laws, both in terms of institutional enforcement design 
and its implementation. 
B. Enhanced Regulatory Intensity in Brazil’s Securities Market? 
Drawing from particular guidelines of a regulatory model to effective 
enforcement for emerging markets may contribute to identifying the de-
velopments of securities enforcement in Brazil during the past decade.54 
This regulatory system roadmap focuses mainly on the securities regula-
tor, but also on the partnerships that it develops with the industry and 
                                                                                                         
 51. See Lei 10.303, de 31 de Outubro de 2001, D.O.U. de 01.11.2001 (Braz.). 
 52. Including insider trading and market manipulation. See id. 
 53. See Pinheiro dos Santos, supra note 41, at 337–39. 
 54. See Birdwell, supra note 39, at 543–44. 
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other law enforcement agencies. The steps of this roadmap that I particu-
larly select for the purposes of this study—to assess Brazil—are: 
1. Political independence of the securities regulator 
2. A stand-alone enforcement program with a mandate 
3. The capacity to identify, target, and sanction serious securities vio-
lations (i.e. financial disclosure fraud, insider trading, market ma-
nipulation) 
4. Comprehensive compulsory investigative authority (i.e. to obtain 
bank records, telephone and online records, witness statements) 
5. A tool-kit to engage in real-time enforcement (i.e. asset freezing 
and financial intelligence units) 
6. Recourse to an effective judiciary with specialized tribunals 
7. Access of the regulator to efficient and effective civil action and 
remedies in the first instance 
8. The ability to settle cases 
9. Developing a partnership with the criminal authorities 
10. Developing a partnership with the industry through a self-
regulatory model 
11. Developing partnerships with the international community to 
maximize cooperation 
The analysis that follows further explains and details these guidelines, 
and evaluates how they have played out in light of recent developments 
in Brazil’s securities enforcement system. 
1. Public Enforcement 
a. Political Independence and Boosted Resources? 
An essential aspect of this roadmap is the political independence of the 
regulator. 
A capital market regulator should be structured by law as an independ-
ent regulatory and law enforcement agency. It should be empowered 
with the discretion to regulate, investigate, and bring enforcement pro-
ceedings to protect investors and to keep the capital market clean and 
honest, all while free of political influence.55 This element is one of the 
principles established by the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (“IOSCO”).56 
                                                                                                         
 55. Id. at 552–56. 
 56. IOSCO, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 3–4 (2010), 
available at http://www.compliance-
exchange.com/governance/library/ioscoprinciples2010.pdf. 
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Unfortunately, Latin American securities regulators have traditionally 
been under the umbrella of the executive power. Finance ministries ap-
point and remove the heads of agencies,57 and also approve of personnel 
hiring. The executive branches also have control over the budget, and 
may authorize proposed rules and exercise enforcement powers. This 
breadth of executive control has affected the operational and budgetary 
autonomy of regulators across the region for years. 
During the past decade, Brazil’s CVM has adopted this important cor-
nerstone of the enforcement wish list, setting an important precedent for 
the region. In a significant institutional change during the wave of reform 
that swept Brazil in the past decade,58 the Securities Act was amended in 
2001,59 declaring CVM an independent government agency, endowed 
with administrative autonomy, and free from the restraints of hierarchic 
subordination. In addition, it was also granted financial and budgetary 
autonomy.60 
Moreover, the reform provided a fixed mandate for each of the five 
members of the Board of Commissioners. Following the SEC model,61 
CVM’s commissioners, including the Chair, are appointed by the Presi-
dent of the Republic and ratified by the Senate62 for five-year terms, with 
one new member elected each year on a staggered basis. In addition, 
commissioners may only be removed if they are convicted of a serious 
crime. This should, in theory, provide for stability and political inde-
pendence of the Board of Commissioners, allowing them decision-
making freedom and effective action. 
                                                                                                         
 57. For example, Mexico’s Minister of Finance may discretionally appoint and re-
move the head of the agency. Brazil appears to be leading this tendency, which other 
markets have followed as well, including Colombia. 
 58. See Fifth Meeting of the Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable, Rio 
de Janeiro, Braz., Oct. 8–9, 2004, The Legal, Regulatory and Institutional Framework for 
Enforcement Issues in Latin America: A Comparison of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia and Peru 2 (2004) (by Daniel Blume), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/30/34254149.pdf. 
 59. Through the enactment of Law 10.411 of February 26, 2002. Lei No. 10.411, de 
26 Fevereiro de 2002, D.O.U. de 27.02.2002 (Braz.). 
 60. See id. art. 1. 
 61. See Santana, supra note 12. 
 62. Lei No. 6.385, art. 6, de 7 de Dezembro de 1976, D.O.U. de 09.12.1976, redação 
dada pela Lei No. 9.457, de 5 de Maio de 1997, D.O.U. de 6.5.97 (Braz.). 
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The law, however, provides that CVM is linked to Brazil’s Ministry of 
Finance.63 In principle, this link should not pose a threat to the agency’s 
independence, but rather allow for accountability—an element that 
should characterize securities regulators.64 In fact, Congress and the Min-
istry of Finance,65 through its Department of Internal Control, oversee 
CVM’s activities.66 
Nevertheless, the law in action reveals particular shortcomings. For in-
stance, CVM does not actually have the financial and budgetary auton-
omy that is provided for by law. The budget is centrally managed 
through Brazil’s treasury department and an amount is allocated to the 
agency every year. CVM does not manage its own revenue, and the in-
come that it generates—via fines, settlements, and an “enforcement 
tax”67 paid by market participants, goes directly to the central govern-
ment for distribution.68 As a result, a significant surplus has been re-
ported in recent years, with CVM’s revenues being much in excess of the 
amount that it receives from the annual budget.69 The agency has not re-
ceived the desired budget to carry out its operations, mainly due to gov-
ernment focus in other priority areas.70 
One illustration involves the 2009 approval of 165 new staff positions 
for CVM. Other government priorities have prevented CVM from hiring 
these allocated employees. This impingement on CVM’s financial 
autonomy also extends to its administrative and operational independ-
ence, not only because it involves the hiring of personnel, but also be-
                                                                                                         
 63. See Lei No. 10.411, art. 1, de 26 Fevereiro de 2002, D.O.U. de 27.02.2002, 
amending Lei No. 6.385, art. 5, de 7 de Dezembro de 1976, D.O.U. de 09.12.1976 
(Braz.). 
 64. See Birdwell, supra note 39, at 555. 
 65. Lei No. 6.385, art. 5, de 7 de Dezembro de 1976, D.O.U. de 09.12.1976,  redação 
dada pela Lei No. 10.411, art. 1, de 26 Fevereiro de 2002, D.O.U. de 27.02.2002 (Braz.). 
 66. CVM undergoes several audits each year which result in a report with recommen-
dations on its activities. Brazil’s Court of Public Account also revises CVM’s activities. 
See, e.g., CVM RELATÓRIO DE GESTÃO 2005, supra note 14. 
 67. CVM’s 2005 Annual Report noted that 91% of the income came from these alter-
native sources. Id. In 2007, this tax was reported to have amounted $60 million. CVM 
RELATÓRIO DE GESTÃO DO EXERCÍCO DE 2009 [ANNUAL REPORT 2009] 29 (2009) (Braz.) 
[hereinafter CVM RELATÓRIO DE GESTÃO 2009], available at 
http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/relgest/RelatóriodeGestãoCVM2009.pdf. According to 2009 
report the amount of fines totaled $29 million in 2007, but totaled $65.5 million in 2006. 
Id. 
 68. CVM RELATÓRIO DE GESTÃO 2009, supra note 67, at 15.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Telephone Interview with María Helena dos Santos Fernandes de Santana, Chair 
of CVM & IOSCO’s Exec. Comm. (Oct. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Santana Interview]. 
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cause a significant number of these new employees were to be allocated 
to enforcement and surveillance efforts.71 
However, since 2005, after CVM’s management decision to prioritize 
enforcement, the central government has strived to provide the agency 
with increased resources.72 Data reported by the Latin American Corpo-
rate Governance Roundtable reveals that CVM’s budget, which 
amounted to $25.8 Million in 2004, increased to $77.2 million in 2007 
and $90.67 million in 2008, a significant rise of 84.6% (in terms of ad-
justed local currency).73 However, as shown in the following table, the 
increase during the mentioned time period is not nearly as impressive 
after normalizing the budget in relation to the size of the market, in terms 
of market capitalization. 
Moreover, to what extent these resources were actually allocated to en-
forcement is difficult to determine, but a breakdown of CVM’s budget 
provides a fairly accurate snapshot.74 A significant percentage of CVM’s 
budget was allocated to an account described as Capital Market Devel-
opment, which at least indirectly is aimed at investor protection. How-
ever, it appears that only a relatively small percentage of that account 
                                                                                                         
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Tenth Meeting of the Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable, 
Santiago, Chile, Dec. 1–2, 2008, The Legal, Regulatory and Institutional Framework for 
Enforcement Issues in Latin America: A Comparison of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Panama and Peru 3 (2009) (by Andreas Grimminger et al.) [hereinafter 2009 
Framework for Enforcement Issues], available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/15/44138533.pdf. 
 74. Annual National Budgets of Brazil 2004–11. See Lei No. 10.837, de 16 de Janeiro 
de 2004, Orçamento Anual de 2004 [Annual Budget], Janeiro 2004 (Braz.), available at 
http://sidornet.planejamento.gov.br/docs/lei2004/index.htm; Lei No. 11.100, de 25 de 
Janeiro de 2005, Orçamento Anual de 2005 [Annual Budget], Janeiro 2005 (Braz.), 
available at http://sidornet.planejamento.gov.br/docs/lei2005/index.htm; Lei No. 11.306, 
de 16 de Maio de 2006, Orçamento Anual de 2006 [Annual Budget], Maio 2006 (Braz.), 
available at http://sidornet.planejamento.gov.br/docs/lei2006/; Lei No. 11.451, de 07 de 
Fevereiro de 2007, Orçamento Anual de 2007 [Annual Budget], Fevereiro 2007 (Braz.), 
available at 
http://www.planejamento.gov.br/secretarias/upload/Legislacao/Leis/070207_lei_11451.p
df; Lei No. 11.647, de 24 de Março de 2008, Orçamento Anual de 2008 [Annual Budget], 
Março 2008 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.planejamento.gov.br/secretarias/upload/Legislacao/Leis/080324_lei_11647.p
df; Lei No. 11.897, de 30 de Dezembro de 2008, Orçamento Anual de 2009 [Annual 
Budget], Dezembro 2008 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.planejamento.gov.br/secretarias/upload/Arquivos/sof/orcamento_09/loa09/Lo
a_2009.pdf; Lei No. 12.214, de 26 de Janeiro de 2010, D.O.U. de 27.01.2010 (Braz.); Lei 
No. 12.381, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2011, D.O.U. de 10.02.2011 (Braz.). 
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(4.9% annualized average) was actually designated for Market Supervi-
sion, Regulation, and Investor Protection. 
 
                                                                                                         
 75. Author’s compilation. Budget collected from Brazil’s Annual National Budgets 
2004–2011 (see supra note 74), was adjusted for inflation (real value in terms of 20011 
BRCy) based on Brazil’s Consumer Price Index (“CPI”)—Calculated from annualized 
data on inflation obtained at: INFLATION, http://www.inflation.eu (last visited May 29, 
2012), and  normalized in relation to Market Capitalization of BM&FBOVESPA stock 
 
CVM Budget 2004–201175 
(“$” Indicates Brazilian Currency in Millions, Decimals Reflect Percentages) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
I. Total Fi-
nancial Sys-
tem Budget 
(Nominal 
Value) 
$8,614 $10,146 $10,340 $13,119 $14,342 $19,862 $19,219 $19,702 
Real Value 
(Adj. to 
inflation) 
$12,221 $13,620 $13,458 $16,346 $16,874 $22,403 $20,468 $19,702 
Normalized 
to Market 
Capitalization 
0.98158 0.91825 0.68269 0.54152 1.03462 0.85642 0.74639 0.86051 
A. Total 
CVM Budget 
(Nominal 
Value) 
$75.40 $79.40 $94.00 $140.20 $162.90 $201.90 $191.20 $267.40 
Real Value 
(Adj. to 
inflation) 
$106.98 $106.59 $122.35 $174.69 $191.66 $227.73 $203.63 $267.40 
Normalized 
to Market 
Capitalization 
0.00859 0.00719 0.00621 0.00579 0.01175 0.00871 0.00743 0.01168 
% of Finan-
cial System 
Budget 
0.88 0.78 0.91 1.10 1.40 1.00 1.00 1.40 
1. Capital 
Market De-
velopment 
$59 $66.40 $77.50 $98.10 $99.60 $101 $124.30 $134.60 
Real Value 
(Adj. to 
inflation) 
$84 $89.14 $100.87 $122.23 $117.18 $114 $132.38 $134.60 
Normalized 
to Market 
Capitalization 
0.00672 0.00601 0.00512 0.00405 0.00719 0.00435 0.00483 0.00588 
% of CVM’s 
Budget  78.00 83.60 82.50 70.00 61.00 50.00 65.00 50.30 
a. Market 
Supervision, 
Regulation & 
Investor 
Protection 
$4.11 $3.22 $2.99 $7.73 $9.53 $3.61 $6.60 $6.90 
Real Value 
(Adj. to 
inflation) 
$2.48 $2.74 $4.76 $9.04 $8.92 $4.83 $6.82 $6.90 
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Normalized 
to Market 
Capitaliza-
tion 
0.00033 0.00022 0.00015 0.00026 0.00058 0.00014 0.00024 0.00030 
% of Capital 
Market 
Develop-
ment 
4.90 3.60 3.00 6.30 8.00 3.20 5 5 
i. Investor 
Protection 
& Assis-
tance 
$1.10 $0.81 $0.71 $1.30 $1.40 $1 $1.40 $1.40 
Real Value 
(Adj. to 
inflation) 
$1.56 $1.09 $0.92 $1.62 $1.65 $1 $1.49 $1.40 
Normalized 
to Market 
Capitaliza-
tion 
0.00013 0.00007 0.00005 0.00005 0.00010 0.00004 0.00005 0.00006 
ii. Market 
Supervision $0.80 $0.80 $0.80 $2.50 $3.30 $9.30 $1.20 $2.00 
Real Value 
(Adj. to 
inflation) 
$1.14 $1.07 $1.04 $3.11 $3.88 $10.49 $1.28 $2.00 
Normalized 
to Market 
Capitaliza-
tion 
0.00009 0.00007 0.00005 0.00010 0.00024 0.00040 0.00005 0.00009 
iii. Informa-
tion Dis-
semination 
& Regula-
tion 
$1.10 $0.81 $0.80 $2.40 $3.40 $1.30 $3.50 $3.50 
Real Value 
(Adj. to 
inflation) 
$1.56 $1.09 $1.04 $2.99 $4.00 $1.47 $3.73 $3.50 
Normalized 
to Market 
Capitaliza-
tion 
0.00013 0.00007 0.00005 0.00010 0.00025 0.00006 0.00014 0.00015 
 
With regards to staff, the Commission also showed an upward trend 
during the decade. The number of employees increased from 363 in 2004 
to 500 in 2008.  
 
                                                                                                         
exchange—end of year market capitalization data from 2004–2011 obtained at: WORLD 
FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES, http://www.world-exchanges.org/ (last visited June 7, 
2012). The market capitalization data was converted from U.S. Dollars to Brazilian Cur-
rency using the end of the year exchange rate (Dec. 31) obtained at: Historical Exchange 
Rates, OANDA, http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/ (last visited May 29, 
2012). 
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CVM Staff 2001–200776 
2001 (January) 327 employees 
2003 (Aug.) 371 employees 
2004∗  363 employees 
2005 (Sep) 500 employees 
2006 (Aug) 487 (451 staff / 36 Federal Attorneys) 
2007 489 (459 Staff / 30 Federal Attorneys) 
2008∗  500 employees 
   
A significant increase occurred in 2005, reflecting CVM’s strategic de-
cision that year to prioritize on enforcement.77 CVM has since continued 
its efforts to increase staff. As mentioned above, new employee positions 
were approved in 2009, but to date are on hiatus given budgetary con-
straints. 
Moreover, as a result of CVM establishing a centralized enforcement 
division in 2008, it also began hiring more specialized staff to conduct 
investigations and pursue cases. In 2009, the department had a staff of 
thirty, composed of twenty-two inspectors, and eight federal prosecu-
tors.78 In addition, the Inspections Department, responsible for external 
inspections, had a staff of forty-two. CVM’s new enforcement division is 
detailed in the section that follows. 
b. A Beefed-Up Enforcement Program and Increased Action 
In the roadmap to effective enforcement, a fundamental step involves 
the regulator establishing a “stand-alone enforcement program with a 
mandate.”79 Among other features, the program should have an enforce-
ment division vested with the responsibility and statutory capacity to in-
vestigate and prosecute serious corporate wrongdoing. It should be able 
to compel evidence and prosecute, employing tools such as stopping on-
going fraud via injunctive orders and asset freezes, and to bring enforce-
ment actions with demonstrable consequences. The program should have 
both investigative and prosecutorial functions, and its investigative staff 
                                                                                                         
 76. 2009 Framework for Enforcement Issues, supra note 73, at 7–8; ROBERT PRINGLE, 
HOW COUNTRIES SUPERVISE THEIR BANKS, INSURERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 2010 
(Risk Books 2009). 
 77. Santana Interview, supra note 70. 
 78. See 2009 Framework for Enforcement Issues, supra note 73, at 3. 
 79. See Birdwell, supra note 39, at 552. 
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should include not only lawyers, but also accountants and personnel with 
experience in prosecuting cases.80 
As is the case with most Latin American jurisdictions, Brazil’s securi-
ties regulator did not have an enforcement department prior to 2008. 
Each of CVM’s eleven divisions, or Superintendencias,81 supervised, 
investigated, and proposed penalties regarding their areas of expertise for 
the Board of Commissioners to decide on. That system has advantages 
and continues to be implemented to this date, particularly given the in-
depth technical expertise of each division. However, with its shift in pol-
icy to prioritize enforcement, CVM established a centralized enforce-
ment program in 2008 aimed at unifying and accelerating enforcement 
activity.82 Enforcement is jointly carried out by two divisions: the Super-
intendencia de Processos Sancionadores (“SPS”) and the Procuradoria 
Federal Especializada (“PFE”).83 
This enforcement program’s institutional design entails a unique model 
of administrative enforcement. Investigations are carried out by the man-
agers and staff of SPS and PFE in collaboration with specialized federal 
attorneys and investigators assigned to CVM. This design reportedly re-
sulted in increased and more focused enforcement activity, targeting se-
rious and sophisticated wrongdoing.84 Moreover, the length of even the 
most complex procedures has been reduced to an average of ten 
months.85 
Carrying on with the roadmap, the ability to settle administrative mat-
ters is also an essential feature of an enforcement program and a useful 
part of its tool-kit.86 Unique among the regulators of the region, CVM 
has had this power since 1997, inspired by the SEC settlement.87 Known 
as Termos de Compromiso, these settlements halt an administrative pro-
ceeding if the accused party agrees to end the unlawful conduct and to 
correct the wrongdoing, in addition to indemnifying the corresponding 
loss. 
                                                                                                         
 80. Id. at 553–54. 
 81. With the same hierarchical level, and headed by a Directors or Superintendentes. 
See Pinheiro dos Santos, supra note 41, at 343–44. 
 82. See 2009 Framework for Enforcement Issues, supra note 73, at 4. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Telephone Interview with Alexandre Pinheiro dos Santos, CVM Att’y Gen. (Gen. 
Counsel) & Head of CVM Legal Dept. (Procuradoria Federal Especializada) (Oct. 13, 
2011) [hereinafter Pinheiro Interview]. 
 85. Pinheiro dos Santos, supra note 41, at 343. 
 86. See Birdwell, supra note 39, at 575–76. 
 87. Pinheiro dos Santos, supra note 41, at 343. 
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However, these settlements had seldom been used until the second half 
of the decade. Aimed at deploying this potentially useful tool, CVM es-
tablished the Committee for Settlements of Proceedings in 2005. This 
committee is led by CVM’s Chief Executive Officer and includes the 
Superintendents of each of CVM’s eleven divisions. Its role broadly in-
volves identifying and negotiating potential settlements of administrative 
cases and delivering opinions on proposals for settlement made by de-
fendants or people under investigation. Proposed settlements are subject 
to review and approval by CVM’s Board of Commissioners. 
The committee has played an active role in institutionalizing the nego-
tiations and settlement process, providing for its legitimacy. Market par-
ticipants involved get to actively engage in the negotiations, which has 
resulted in a more open and transparent process. CVM’s Board of Com-
missioners usually, though not always, accepts the terms proposed, 
which also speaks to the authority of the process.88 Moreover, the reduc-
tion in the length of administrative procedures and investigations may 
also explain why market participants prefer to reach a settlement, rather 
than wait for a decision by CVM’s Board of Commissioners. Further, the 
Enforcement Division has been bringing more cases, resulting in in-
creased settlements.89 Another aspect that may be appealing to both regu-
lators and market participants is that these settlements are not subject to 
approval by the courts. 
Preliminary data may speak to the increase in enforcement activity by 
CVM, regarding administrative action pursued via its new centralized 
enforcement division and settlements. Surveys conducted by the Latin 
American Roundtable for Corporate Governance both before and after 
CVM’s shift in policy prioritizing enforcement reflect the contrast in en-
forcement between the first and second half of the decade.90 
There is an upward trend in the number of administrative sanctions 
imposed by Brazil’s securities regulator, resulting from administrative 
procedures. These amounted to 542 between the period from 2006 to 
July 2009, of which 448 were fines and 94 were suspensions.91 This was 
an increase from the 319 sanctions imposed during the 2001–2003 pe-
riod, which featured 313 fines and 6 suspensions.92 Even more striking is 
the difference in the amount of fines imposed during the 2006–2009 pe-
riod, which totaled $279.5 million, versus a much lower $81.7 million 
                                                                                                         
 88. Santana Interview, supra note 70. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See 2009 Framework for Enforcement Issues, supra note 73, at 3–5. 
 91. Id. at 8. 
 92. Id. 
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for the 2001–2003 period.93 During the recent period, the highest indi-
vidual fine was also significantly higher, amounting to $38.5 million, 
compared to $22.5 million in the earlier period.94 
 
CVM Administrative Sanctions  2001–2003 / 2006–200995 
 
Number of Fines 
 
Amount of  
Total Fines 
(U.S. millions) 
Highest Fine in 
period  
(U.S. millions) 
2001 131 – 
2002 55 – 
2003 127 – 
 
$22.5 
 
Total 313 $81.7  
 
2006 184 $65.5 
2007 105 $29 
2008 103 $185 
 
$38.5 
Jul. 2009 56 –  
Total 448 $279.5  
 
Administrative sanctions are not always final, however.96 Of the 448 
fines imposed between 2006 and July 2009, a very high number, 313 
(over 70%) were subject to appeals processes.97  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                         
 93. Id. at 7. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 7–8. 
 96. Final decisions of CVM relating to enforcement may be appealed before the Con-
selho de Recursos do Sistema Financeiro Nacional—CRSFN, an administrative body 
composed of representatives of CVM, the Central Bank of Brazil, the Finance Ministry, 
and regulated agents. There is no possibility of appeal before the judiciary. See id. at 8. 
 97. Id. at 6–8. 
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CVM Administrative Sanctions 2006–200998 
 Number 
of Fines 
Number of 
Fines 
Appealed 
Appeals Status 
In 2004 (for the 2003–2006 fines) / 
In 2009 (for the 2006–2009 fines) 
2001 131 114 74 upheld / 13 reversed 
2002 55 66 14 upheld / 7 reversed 
2003 127 87 0 upheld / 0 reversed 
Total 313 267 
90 upheld / 20 reversed / 108 
modified / 49 pending 
 
2006 184 134 4 upheld / 10 dismissed / 120 pending 
2007 105 81 4 upheld / 77 pending 
2008 103 84 1 upheld / 83 pending 
2009  
(1st 
semes-
ter) 56 19 0 upheld / 0 dismissed / 19 pending 
Total 448 318 19 processed / 280 pending 
 
For the 2001–2003 period, most of the appeals were processed by the 
end of the three-year period, that is, 218 of the total 267 appeals.99 
Though a considerable number were upheld, and there were only a few 
reversals, 108 cases were modified.100 What is of more concern is that for 
the 2006–2009 period, of the 313 appeals only 19 (6%) were actually 
processed by the end of that period.101 
Since 2005, there has been increased focus on more sophisticated 
wrongdoing, particularly insider trading. Although relatively few admin-
istrative cases have been decided regarding this misconduct, they con-
cern a considerable number of defendants. These figures reflect that en-
forcement activity is now visible in this area, and speak to CVM’s efforts 
to bring action in this front.102  
 
 
 
                                                                                                         
 98. Id. at 7–8. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Pinheiro Interview, supra note 84. 
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Insider Trading Cases Judged by CVM 
Year 
Number of adminis-
trative cases judged 
and/or with Termo 
de Compromisso 
Number of  
defendants 
Charged as Guilty or 
Closed with celebration of 
Termo de Compromisso  
2005 4 14 2 
2006 5 21 17 
2007 4 40 22 
2008 7 36 19 
2009 3 4 2 
2010 10 33 29 
2011 2 3 3 
Total 35 151 94 
Source: Comissão de Valores Mobiliários  
 
The Termos de Compromiso settlements have witnessed a significant 
increase too, as shown in the following graph. Not surprisingly, this rise 
began after 2005, following the establishment of the Committee for the 
Settlement of Procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of settlements skyrocketed from nineteen in 2006 to over 
sixty in the years that followed. As shown in the table below, the number 
of defendants entering into the agreements surged as well, as did the total 
amount paid as a result. Significant amounts were paid per settlement 
too, with the lowest settlement signed in 2008 amounting to almost 
$10,000, the average to $53,026, and the highest to over $3 million. In 
contrast, the average fine that year amounted to almost $1.5 million, and 
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the highest imposed was $38.5 million.103 This considerable difference 
may explain not only why most administrative decisions (which impose 
fines) are appealed, but also why market participants increasingly con-
sider settling.  
 
TERMOS DE COMPROMISO 
Year Number Number of defendants Amount Paid (R$) 
1998 2 4 $2,679.87 
1999 3 5 $0.00 
2000 5 30 $3,347,001.77 
2001 1 3 $266,414.48 
2002 7 31 $520,000.00 
2003 4 7 $10,000.00 
2004 7 23 $254,407.97 
2005 15 51 $17,529,100.00 
2006 19 96 $1,911,986.28 
2007 64 159 $46,054,291.88 
2008 64 112 $10,660,927.80 
2009 58 84 $11,045,731.74 
2010 64 141 $57,502,975.77 
2011 36 70 $170,469,222.67 
Total 349 816 $319,574,740.23 
Source: CVM’s Procuradoria Federal Especializada (PFE) 
 
Yet another step toward effective enforcement entails developing a 
partnership with the criminal justice authorities. To that end, during the 
latter half of the past decade, CVM actively cooperated with the Brazil-
ian Federal Police Department and the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. This 
joint action was the result of an inter-institutional relationship that has 
deepened over the past six years, which has already led to the signing of 
cooperation agreements among the three institutions.104 This collabora-
tion has resulted in the use of more sophisticated tools that have allowed 
CVM to engage in real-time enforcement. This has included the freezing 
of assets on a considerable number of occasions during recent years. 
As previously mentioned, a series of offenses were criminalized early 
in the decade, including insider trading and market manipulation. 
Though that was an important achievement, it was not until these col-
                                                                                                         
 103. See 2009 Framework for Enforcement Issues, supra note 73, at 7. 
 104. Pinheiro Interview, supra note 84. 
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laborations began that real implementation has materialized. For in-
stance, in 2011, CVM and the Federal Prosecutors Office were able to 
obtain the first criminal conviction in Brazil for insider trading, in the 
Sadia case.105 This active interplay among enforcers might be a reflection 
of Brazil moving toward a “multiple-enforcers” model. 
CVM and the Federal Prosecutors office have also joined together to 
revive the Collective Civil Action. Though it dates back to 1989, it had 
not been employed until very recently, as a result of CVM’s recent en-
forcement efforts. Unlike U.S. class actions, the remedy is not available 
for market participants to file directly, but CVM and the Federal Prose-
cutors Office may do it on their behalf. CVM has increasingly been filing 
these actions on behalf of numerous market participants. The compensa-
tion obtained is then sent back to a fund to pay people who incurred 
losses. This process is an important instrument that is gaining relevance 
and momentum, though CVM is very selective in its use. Although there 
are not many cases to date, CVM set important precedents in recent 
years, particularly regarding insider trading.106 One deterrent to wider use 
of this instrument, however, is the judiciary’s lack of expertise in capital 
markets matters. 
Finally, in terms of maximizing its capacity to engage in international 
cooperation, CVM’s policy on enforcement has led it to reach out to the 
global community in order to improve its enforcement practices and ex-
change information with securities regulators around the world. Securi-
ties enforcement in Brazil follows the IOSCO Objectives and Principles 
of Securities Regulation. This commitment is reflected in CVM’s signing 
the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation 
and Assistance in 2009, aimed at international cooperation among regu-
lators for pursuing the increasing amount of securities violations having 
international dimensions.107 A more recent example of this international 
interplay among regulators was a technical assistance workshop on en-
forcement practices hosted and sponsored by CVM in May 2011, to 
                                                                                                         
 105. Two former officers of Sadia, S.A. were convicted by a court and sentenced to 
prison and a fine. J.F.S.P., Crim. No. 2009.61.81.005123-4, 16.02.2011, 182 Diário do 
Judiciário Eletrônico [D.J.e.], 02.10.2009, 234 (Braz.) (on file with the author). 
 106. Pinheiro Interview, supra note 84. 
 107. MMoU, supra note 50. The fact that CVM’s chair is also the current Chair of 
IOSCO’s Executive Committee further reflects Brazil’s commitment with the interna-
tional community regarding collaboration among regulators in terms of global market 
surveillance. 
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which the Office of International Affairs of the SEC substantially con-
tributed through its Technical Assistance Program.108 
2. Self-Regulation—Toward a Multiple-Enforcers Model? 
A securities authority needs to develop a partnership with the industry 
via a self-regulatory regime.109 Brazil has strong foundations in self-
regulation dating back to before the turn of the century. The Brazilian 
Corporate Governance Institute (“IBGC”) was established in 1995 to 
guide qualifying directors and senior officers of companies in the appli-
cation of corporate governance principles. In 1998, the National Invest-
ment Bank Association (“ANBID”) launched its self-regulatory code for 
public offerings of securities, imposing stricter standards than those of 
the legislation of the time. In 2000, the stock exchange launched the 
Novo Mercado and Corporate Governance Levels II and III listing seg-
ments, involving corporate government standards and requirements that 
also went further than the law. 
CVM has supported and capitalized on these self-regulatory develop-
ments, ultimately designing an SRO regime that is both mandatory and 
voluntary. The mandatory dimension is of a statutory nature and in-
volves, as legal conditions to operate, requirements to issuers. An impor-
tant step came in 2007, when the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange 
(“BOVESPA”)110 and the Brazilian Mercantile & Futures Exchange 
(“BM&F”)111 demutualized, launched their IPOs, and merged, resulting 
in BM&FBOVESPA.112 Practically in tandem, and foreseeing potential 
conflicts of interest, CVM issued Instruction No. 461/07,113 providing for 
a detailed legal framework of self-regulation for stock exchanges and 
other organized markets.114 
Under this framework, organized securities markets must be structured, 
maintained, and inspected by “managing entities” authorized by CVM, 
                                                                                                         
 108. CVM & BM&FBOVESPA, Bilateral Enforcement Program with Brazilian Regu-
lators and Prosecutors (May 2–6, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_emergtech.shtml. 
 109. See Birdwell, supra note 39, at 579. 
 110. The company that actually launched the IPO was BOVESPA Holding Group, of 
which the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange was a subsidiary. This took place on October 26, 
2007. 
 111. BM&F’s IPO took place on November 30, 2007. 
 112. Brazil’s only stock exchange, and the third largest in the world. 
 113. Instruçao CVM No. 461, de 23 de Outubro de 2007, D.O.U. de 
24.10.2007 (Braz.) [hereinafter CVM Instruction No. 461]. 
 114. Including OTC and commodities and futures markets. 
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organized as associations or stock corporations.115 These managing enti-
ties are responsible for the preservation and self-regulation of the securi-
ties markets they manage, and it is their legal duty to maintain the bal-
ance between their own interests and the public interests to be served.116 
In turn, to perform the self-regulatory supervision and enforcement, 
managing entities may either (1) form an association, controlled entity, 
or entity under common control, or (2) outsource the task to an inde-
pendent third-party. 
BM&FBOVESPA is the managing entity responsible for Brazil’s secu-
rities markets. Unlike the U.S. exchanges, BM&FBOVESPA has not yet 
outsourced its market surveillance and oversight activities to a third-
party enforcer like FINRA. However, it did establish a functionally 
autonomous and financially independent non-profit subsidiary with con-
siderable rule-making and enforcement powers to perform the task: 
BM&FBOVESPA Supervisão de Mercados (“BSM”).117 
A specific example of the interplay of public enforcement with self-
regulation is provided by Instruction 461/07,118 which establishes that in 
relation to penalties for violations of rules under its jurisdiction, CVM 
may deduct penalties that have already been imposed under mandatory 
self-regulation, including penalties imposed by BSM. In that respect, 
CVM is reported to be reasonable, and it capitalizes on this division of 
labor, which has reportedly proved successful in recent years and con-
tributes to CVM’s prioritizing of its resources.119 
The other self-regulatory dimension is of a non-statutory nature, which 
CVM has promoted via regulatory incentives. These have included fast-
track securities (debenture) offerings (avoiding paperwork and costs) 
after complying with best corporate practices, such as those established 
by the Investment Bank Association (“ANBID”) Code regarding public 
offerings. Another example is CVM Instruction 471 of 2008, which of-
fers a fast track for offerings that have been reviewed by a self-regulatory 
entity under an agreement with CVM.120 In addition to enhancing inves-
tor confidence through disclosure practices, this has allowed CVM to 
save and focus its resources on other priorities. 
                                                                                                         
 115. CVM Instruction No. 461/07, art. 9. 
 116. Id. art. 14. 
 117. BSM started operating on October 1, 2007. 
 118. CVM Instruction No. 461, art. 49, para. 5. 
 119. Santana Interview, supra note 70. 
 120. Instruçao CVM No. 471, de 8 de Augusto de 2008, D.O.U. de 11.08.2008 (Braz.) 
[hereinafter CVM Instruction No. 471]. 
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As a result of these developments, Brazil’s securities market may be 
further shifting toward a “multiple-enforcers” model. 
3. Private Rights of Action—Are They on the Way? 
So far Brazil’s securities enforcement system appears to satisfy several 
of the guidelines considered to contribute to effective enforcement. 
However, there is one important instrument that it does not yet offer: re-
course to an effective judiciary with specialized tribunals that have the 
capacity to entertain capital markets matters.121 
Private enforcement of securities markets violations is rare in Latin 
America, and Brazil is not an exception.122 Market participants may re-
sort to the Brazilian court system, but seldom do in practice. In part, this 
may be due to the lack of specialized judges trained in capital markets 
and securities regulation.123 The courts also present other problems, such 
as lengthy procedures that become expensive. In turn, most of the cases 
related to corporate and securities law often result in settlement agree-
ments, so there is even less incentive to use the courts.124 
Another potential explanation involves the perception by the market 
that CVM is quite efficient and able to deal with very complex legal is-
sues. This further preempts the judiciary from being activated.125 If, in 
fact, CVM is bringing more actions, this may trigger the involvement of 
the courts in the foreseeable future. This scenario might provide incen-
tives to challenge or delay a ruling by CVM, and may ultimately result in 
further specialization of the judiciary to handle these matters.126 
Another factor worth noting is that a good number of issuers are listed 
in Level II of the Novo Mercado market, and accordingly are obliged to 
adhere to an arbitration procedure rather than resort to the courts. Unfor-
tunately, illustrating a shortcoming of self-regulation, arbitration has not 
                                                                                                         
 121. Birdwell, supra note 39, at 576–77. 
 122. See Nelson Eizirik, Concept Paper Presented at the Harvard Law School First 
Annual Symposium on Building the Financial System of the 21st Century: An Agenda 
for Latin America and the United States: Insider Trading Law in Brazil: Recent Devel-
opments 83, 83–89 (June 13–15, 2008), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/symposia/brazil/2008-
latam/08lafinalreport.pdf. 
 123. Santana Interview, supra note 70. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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been used by market participants, as it is often considered too expen-
sive.127 
A related step in the roadmap involves the access of a regulator to civil 
remedies in order to instigate action in the first instance.128 Regulators in 
Brazil have access to civil action. However, civil remedies, as with pri-
vate rights of action, are often not pursued in practice and CVM prefers 
to proceed administratively. Moreover, as opposed to market partici-
pants, CVM does not have the option of resorting to the state courts, 
which have more experience in dealing with private commercial matters 
than the federal courts. 
The upside is that there are signs of improvement that may lead Brazil 
to include private rights of action in its emerging multiple-enforcers 
model. Judges have reportedly been receptive to this in recent matters. In 
what might be the most relevant collective civil action to date, CVM re-
portedly did not face major difficulties in presenting the matter thor-
oughly to the court.129 Other efforts have involved collaboration agree-
ments between CVM and the judiciary to increase communication and 
exchange of information concerning Brazil’s capital market. During the 
last two to three years, CVM has designed programs for judges to par-
ticipate in, yielding positive results.130 CVM has also increased its inter-
actions with the courts via amicus briefs and expert opinions regarding 
conflicts among market participants. 
Finally, there has been a tendency toward specialization. One innova-
tion is a specialized commercial court in Rio de Janeiro. This is still a 
preliminary experience that lacks institutionalization. Among other is-
sues, problems arise when a judge is promoted and needs to be replaced. 
A system to keep the judges educated and specialized in the field of capi-
tal markets is needed.131 More resources should also be directed toward 
Brazil’s judiciary to establish “commercial courts . . . in the cities with 
stronger business activities,” and to invest in specialized training.132 
                                                                                                         
 127. Id. 
 128. Birdwell, supra note 39, at 568. Considering that it may be easier to pursue seri-
ous wrongdoing via the civil procedure, as it usually provides simpler standards of proof 
than the criminal path. 
 129. Pinheiro Interview, supra note 84. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Santana Interview, supra note 70.  
 132. See Isabella Saboya, Partner, Investidor Professional, Address at the Fifth Meet-
ing of the Latin Am. Corp. Governance Roundtable: Legal, Regulatory and Institutional 
Framework for Enforcement—State of Play and Key 
Challenges (Oct. 8, 2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/42/33940873.pdf. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
These preliminary findings indicate that, within the global context and 
during a period of ongoing legal and institutional corporate reform dating 
back to the turn of the century, Brazil has shifted toward enhanced regu-
latory intensity in the enforcement of its securities laws. The research 
identifies a series of developments in institutional design and implemen-
tation that reflect this shift. 
This transformation in Brazil’s securities enforcement system followed 
a 2005 change in policy whereby CVM made enforcement its main prior-
ity. Consequently, CVM became an enforcement-driven agency, em-
bodying characteristics reminiscent of regulators in developed securities 
markets like the United States. This transformation involved both the 
development and implementation of new enforcement institutions and 
practices, and the resurgence of older ones that had been in place but had 
seldom been engaged. 
Key developments suggesting enhanced regulatory intensity included 
the establishment of a new stand-alone enforcement program within 
CVM that includes a centralized enforcement program aimed at enhanc-
ing enforcement activity via two specialized divisions: the Superinten-
dencia de Processos Sancionadores and the Procuradoria Federal Espe-
cializada. This enforcement mandate was created with a unique design, 
combining federal attorneys and staff with prosecutorial and investiga-
tive functions. A surge in enforcement activity, particularly regarding 
administrative action, penalties, and settlements, became clear after this 
enforcement program came into play in the second half of the decade. 
Other signs of improvement included swifter administrative procedures 
and a focus on more serious misconduct, namely insider trading and 
market manipulation. 
In addition to administrative action, the enforcement team diversified 
toward both civil and criminal actions. This resulted in the revival of the 
Collective Civil Action, a class-action type remedy that had not been 
employed before, which led to an increased use of the courts. Further, a 
collaboration with the criminal justice authorities allowed for the suc-
cessful prosecution of wrongdoing that had been criminalized earlier in 
the decade, and triggered the use of a more sophisticated tool-kit, includ-
ing the freezing of assets and injunctive orders. 
Moreover, to spark the use of an important tool that had lacked legiti-
macy and use—the power to settle cases—CVM created the Committee 
for Settlements of Proceedings. This new institution legitimized a nego-
tiations process that resulted in a striking rise in Termos de Compromisso 
settlements, yet another sign of enhanced enforcement activity. 
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CVM further developed a strong partnership with the industry, estab-
lishing a self-regulatory regime with both mandatory and voluntary di-
mensions. On the mandatory (statutory) side, a detailed legal framework 
of self-regulation for organized markets was set in place, including both 
enhanced listing requirements for public firms and the effective 
outsourcing of market surveillance to a quasi-regulator SRO with en-
hanced rule-making and enforcement powers. On the voluntary front, 
significant incentives led firms to adopt higher corporate governance 
standards that went beyond the law. 
Additional trends included international cooperation and assistance 
with other securities regulators of the world, the adoption of international 
principles involving enhanced enforcement practices, and reaching out to 
developed markets for technical support in order to improve market sur-
veillance. 
A surge in the resources of the securities regulator during this period, 
both in budget and staffing, also suggests increased focus on enforce-
ment. However, challenges in this area became apparent, revealing lim-
ited administrative and budgetary autonomy of the regulator, restricting 
its access to the resources and personnel needed for market surveillance 
and enforcement. 
Another shortcoming is the lack of specialized tribunals and judges 
trained in capital market matters. This may explain why private rights of 
action are practically null, and why procedures are sluggish and costly. It 
may also explain why CVM does not instigate civil action in the first 
instance but, rather, proceeds administratively. There are, however, ten-
dencies that might make way for increased involvement of the courts, 
including attempts to establish specialized commercial courts, and recent 
collaboration and exchanges of information between the securities regu-
lator and the courts. 
To what extent do all these developments speak to globalization of se-
curities enforcement and the influence of developed markets in the evo-
lution of emerging securities enforcement systems? There are interesting 
indicators in light of the Brazilian example. These include, with regards 
to the securities regulator, (1) the adoption of a policy to prioritize en-
forcement; (2) modeling its structure after the SEC’s “sole-entity” 
model,133 including an independent Board of Commissioners; (3) under-
going a transformation into an enforcement-driven agency; (4) achieving 
considerable political independence; (5) establishing a stand-alone en-
forcement program with a mandate; (6) having access to an enhanced 
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tool-kit to combat serious corporate wrongdoing in “real-time”; (7) the 
ability to settle; and (8) active partnerships with the criminal justice 
authorities; (9) with the industry; and (10) and with the international 
community. 
These partnerships also speak to the development of a “multiple-
enforcers” model reminiscent of developed markets. Despite the practical 
absence of private rights of action, the securities regulator has come to 
rely on collaboration with other law enforcement agencies, and has en-
gaged in an active interplay with a sophisticated self-regulatory regime, 
sharing the burden of market surveillance with a quasi-governmental 
FINRA-like SRO. 
Brazil’s recent experience with securities enforcement could well be a 
reflection of the path that lies ahead for emerging capital markets in to-
day’s global arena. 
 
